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Abstract
An influential line of argument holds that trade exposure causes economic uncertainty and
spurs popular demands for compensatory and risk-sharing welfare state spending. The
argument has gained renewed prominence through the recent work of Garrett (1998) and
Rodrik (1997; 1998). This paper argues that the relationship between trade openness and
welfare state expansion is spurious, and that the engine of welfare state expansion since
the 1960s has been deindustrialization. Based on cross-sectional time-series data for 15
OECD countries we show that there is no relationship between trade exposure and the
level of labor market risks (in terms of employment and wages), whereas the uncertainty
and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for
compensating welfare state policies. Yet, while differential rates of deindustrialization
explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state, its particular character -- in terms
of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments -- is
shaped by government partisanship. The argument has implications for the study, and the
future,of thewelfare state thatarevery different from thosesuggested in the trade openness
literature.
Zusammenfassung
In vielen einflußreichen Diskussionsbeiträgen wird die Meinung vertreten, daß die
Liberalisierung des Handels ökonomische Verunsicherung zur Folge habe und damit zu
Forderungen nach ausgleichenden wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Ausgaben führe. Die Arbeiten
von Garrett (1998) und Rodrik (1997;1998) verliehen diesem Argument zusätzliche
Relevanz. Gegenstand dieser Untersuchung ist die Beziehung zwischen Ausmaß an
Offenheit einer Volkswirtschaft und der Ausdehnung des Wohlfahrtsstaates, dessen
großzügige Entwicklung seit den 1960er Jahren durch zunehmende Deindustrialisierung
ermöglicht wurde. Auf der Grundlage von Analysen länderübergreifender Zeitreihen und
von 15 OECD-Ländern wird gezeigt, daß kein Zusammenhang zwischen einer
Handelsliberalisierung und dem Grad der Arbeitsmarktrisiken (bezogen auf Löhne und
Beschäftigung) besteht. Angesichts der durch die Deindustrialisierung verursachten
Unsicherheit kommt es jedoch von seiten der Wähler zu Forderungen nach einer
ausgleichenden Sozialpolitik. Während das Ausmaß der Deindustrialisierung die Größe
und Ausstattung des Wohlfahrsstaates determiniert, wird sein spezifischer Charakter -
hinsichtlich der direkten Regierungsdienstleistungen und der ausgleichenden
Transferzahlungen - von den Regierungsparteien geprägt. Diese Argumentation ist von
großer Tragweite für die Analyse und Zukunft des Wohlfahrtsstaates; sie weicht gravierend
von der Literatur über offene Volkswirtschaften ab.
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1Introduction
It is commonplace to argue that the increasing openness of national economies has meant
growing economic insecurity. This insecurity once supposedly fuelled demands for larger welfare
spending as a form of insurance (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985), but the rising tide of
globalization is now widely seen as making the meeting of these demands well-neigh impossible,
and, indeed, has worked to reduce the size and scope of government (Rodrik 1997). An
alternative view is one that combines this “second image reversed” with a concern for the
political power of labor and the left (Garrett 1995; 1998). This revisionist perspective suggests
that the challenges promoted by globalization when met by strong left-labor power within the
domestic political system combine to produce a compensation strategy that entails a large and
vibrant welfare state. This paper challenges both of these views. Our argument, in short, is that
most of the risks being generated in modern industrialized societies are the product of
technologically induced structural transformations inside national labor markets. Increasing
productivity, changing consumption patterns, and saturated demand for products from the
traditional sectors of the economy are the main forces of change. It is these structural sources of
risk that fuel demands for state compensation and risk sharing.
The transformation of labor markets in recent decades is revealed in a dramatic shift in the
employment structure. The two traditional, and until recently leading, sectors of employment,
i.e., agriculture and industry, have everywhere contracted. In 1960 an average of about 60 percent
of total employment was in agriculture or manufacturing. Over a 31 years period this figure has
been nearly cut in half. However, there is considerable variation in the speed with which this
transition has occurred. In the United States, for example, only four and a half percent of the
working age population lost employment in these sectors over the last three decades, whereas in
countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and Denmark the comparable figure is fifteen
percent or more. The numbers for six countries are shown in the first column of Table 1
(Appendix A provides data for a larger sample of 15 countries). Note that in addition to cross-
national variance, the speed of the process has also varied a great deal over time, sometimes
2exhibiting a slow and steady trickle of new redundancies, at other times resulting in headline-
grabbing factory closings and massive layoffs. 
[Table 1 about here]
Individuals face significant risks as a result of these shifts. Those thrown out of a job, or
threatened by the loss of employment, may find that the skills they have acquired are not easily
transferable to other parts of the economy where employment may be expanding, viz., the service
sector. Even where employment is available, a job outside one of traditional sectors often entails
significant losses in income, as well as the deprivation, at least in part, of pension rights, medical
insurance, and other work-related benefits. For many, indeed, loss of employment in the
traditional sectors entails complete removal from the active labor force. As one scholar notes, a
significant part of this change in the occupational structure has taken place through the entry of
young people into service employment and the early retirement of older workers from the
traditional sectors (Blossfeld, 1992, p. 169). This is attested to by the dramatic reduction in
employment activity on the part of older workers who have in one way or another been pushed
into “early retirement” during the last few decades (Kohli, Rein, Guillemard, and van Gunsteren
1991).
Broadly speaking, governments have responded to the transformation of the employment
structure in three distinct ways. The first has been to promote employment in private services,
often by deregulating product and labor markets and allowing greater wage dispersion, while
using various forms of public insurance to compensate workers for the risks of having to find
new jobs in services. The United States is the archetypical example of this strategy, but Canada,
the UK, and more recently also the Netherlands, share some of the same features. In the US,
since the expansion of private service employment has exceeded the relative modest loss in the
traditional sectors, employment rates in that country have actually increased (as indicated by the
minus signs in columns C and F of Table 1).
3The second strategy is for the state to maintain extensive regulation of private services, as well as
a relatively compressed wage structure, while simultaneously expanding employment in public
services. Countries that have heavily engaged in this sort of strategy, most notably in
Scandinavia, have also generally managed to elevate the total labor force participation rate. On
the spending side, the result has been a substantial rise in government consumption, often
complemented by an expansion of the state’s public insurance functions in order to compensate
for the risks associated with often very large employment losses in the traditional sectors (see the
numbers for Denmark and Sweden). 
Finally, there are those economies where heavy regulation of labor and product markets have
hampered a major expansion of private sector service employment, while at the same time the
public sector has not been allowed to grow to any significant extent. In combination with the
large losses that have occurred in the traditional sectors, this has led to a tremendous reduction in
employment possibilities for those formerly active. Examples of states that have followed this
route include Germany and France, and much of the welfare effort in these countries have been
geared towards ensuring a relatively orderly and secure exit from the labor market, mainly
through early retirement. Limiting labor force participation in this manner is expensive, and,
depending of the severity of shifts in the occupational structure, is often supplemented by an
increase in the state’s insurance role (as in the other countries). This response therefore creates
transfer- as opposed to consumption-heavy welfare states. 
The three responses clearly resonates with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states
(liberal, social democratic and Christian democratic), and we believe that partisan politics has
played an important role in shaping these responses (see also Iversen and Wren 1998). By
focusing on these major shifts in the labor market, and the partisan responses to these, we thus
point to a causal structure that can help make sense of one of the most influential contemporary
typologies of welfare states. The main focus of this paper, however, is to convince the reader that
growth in both transfers and government consumption — the two main components of welfare
state spending — can largely be explained as a function of the severity of internally driven
4employment losses in the traditional sectors, not by forces in the global economy. Precisely
because the underlying causal logic defines the available courses of political action, and hence
helps us to account for the observed variance in welfare state forms, getting the causal story right
is important. This is also important for the sake of understanding how the politics of the welfare
state is likely to change in the future. Since the processes of globalization and deindustrialization
have very different distributions in time and space, the pattern of welfare expansion (or
contraction) should vary accordingly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. In the first we examine the arguments
of two leading scholars, both of whom see the increasing integration of national markets into the
international economy as the most powerful force affecting governments´ commitments to
welfare spending. The evidence we present suggests that there is little empirical basis to sustain
such a position. We then introduce and outline the logic of our own argument, focussing on the
consequences of the employment dislocations connected to these major shifts in the occupational
labor market structure since the early 1960s. In the third section this argument is tested on data
for 15 OECD countries over a period of 33 years, followed by an analysis that defends our
argument and results against the charges that deindustrialization is a result of either government
spending itself or globalization. We conclude with a discussion of why domestic, as opposed to
international forces, have been ignored in recent research, and we point to several areas where
future research could prove fruitful.
Discounting globalization
The argument that globalization leads to welfare state expansion rests on two causal mechanisms.
First, trade and capital market integration is said to expose domestic economies to greater real
economic volatility which implies higher income and employment risks for workers. Second,
greater labor market risks are hypothesized to generate political demands for expansionary
spending policies that will cushion and compensate people for such risks. Rodrik (1998) focuses
on the effects of trade, and explains the logic in the following manner:
5More open economies have greater exposure to the risks emanating from turbulence in
world markets. We can view larger government spending in such economies as
performing an insulation function, insofar as the government sector is the “safe” sector
(in terms of employment and purchases from the rest of the economy) relative to other
activities, and especially compared to tradables (p. 13).
Garrett (1998) affirms the trade openness argument, but argues that the logic extends to
globalization more broadly, including growing capital market integration:
[P]erhaps the most important immediate effect of globalization is to increase social
dislocations and economic insecurity, as the distribution of incomes and jobs across firms
and industries becomes increasingly unstable. The result is that increasing numbers of
people have to spend evermore time and money trying to make their future more secure
(p. 7).
Although Garrett’s argument for capital market openness is novel, the trade openness thesis has a
long history in political science, including the seminal works of Cameron (1978), Ruggie (1983)
and Katzenstein (1985). To our knowledge the trade argument has not been subject to any serious
challenges, and it stands out as the most important explanation for the rise of the welfare state
since the Second World War. The role of capital market integration is more contentious because
of the effects such integration may have on macroeconomic autonomy (Scharpf 1991; Kurzer
1993), but it is a logical extension of the trade openness argument. 
We find it surprising that not more critical attention has been devoted to the alleged linkage
between international economic exposure and labor market risks. Although it is undeniable that
international market volatility increases labor market risks, whether openness is related to risk
depends on the extent to which international market volatility is greater than domestic market
volatility. It is not sufficient, for example, to show that international price volatility, measured as
terms of trade instability, is related to spending (see Rodrik 1997, ch 3; 1998). In addition, at
61
 The government sector is less volatile, but it does not make sense to include it in the
comparison since it is supposed to be growing as a consequence of high volatility in exposed
sectors. 
least one of two conditions must obtain: i) price volatility in international markets is greater than
in domestic markets, and ii) trade concentrates risks more than it diversifies it. 
There are no theoretical reasons to expect the first condition to hold, and trade theory does not
make strong predictions about the second. Although trade concentrates risks to the extent that it
leads to specialization, it diversifies risks to the extent that it occurs across several national
markets. Which effect dominates depends on the covariance of volatility across product and
national markets. If specialization occurs within product categories that are exposed to similar
cycles (complementarities), while trade occurs across national markets that are subject to
different cycles, trade will actually lead to lower overall volatility. Since the bulk of trade within
the OECD is intra-industry, and occurs across numerous national markets, there is little a priori
reason to expect that trade is associated with greater volatility. But only empirical evidence can
resolve the issue.
For this purpose we have compared volatility in output, employment, and wages across the
manufacturing sectors of 16 OECD countries with very different exposures  to trade (see Figure
1). Output and wages are measured in real terms, and volatility is defined as the standard
deviation of annual growth rates between 1970 and 1993. This formula is identical to the one
used in Rodrik (1998) to measure volatility in terms of trade, but here we are able to explore
directly whether volatility in real variables is related to trade. As a baseline for the comparison,
the figure shows the average volatility of a completely non-traded (but private) service sector &
community, social, and personal services (indicated by the three dotted horizontal lines).1
[Figure 1 about here]
7Contrary to the logic of the trade openness argument, there is no relationship between the export
dependence of manufacturing (measured as the value of exports divided by manufacturing value-
added) and any of the volatility measures. The only variable weakly related to export dependence
is output volatility, but the association is in the opposite direction of the one implied by the trade
openness argument. Nor is there any evidence that the traded manufacturing sector is more
volatile than the average for the nontraded service sector. Finally, it is noteworthy that there is no
association between the level of volatility and Katzenstein’s distinction between small corporatist
welfare states and large liberal (or statist) ones.
If we changed the x-axis in Figure 1 to measure capital market openness instead of trade
openness, the pattern would be no clearer. It does not appear to be the case that greater openness
to the international financial system increases the volatility of the domestic real economy.
Moreover, even if that proved to be the case, greater exposure to speculative capital flows may
well be associated with a countervailing reduction in the capacity of governments to respond to
pressures for compensation. 
But if these findings are correct, how is it possible that previous work has found such a clear link
between globalization (especially trade openness) and spending? To answer this question we
would like to draw attention to some important methodological issues in this work. Katzenstein
(1985) never presents any systematic evidence that openness and spending are related. Instead, he
describes how policy-making in small and open economies have led to a substantial expansion in
the government’s role in the economy. Clearly, it is difficult to assess whether this is due to
trade-openness or some other feature that these countries have in common. Cameron (1978)
offers some cross-sectional evidence, but this is in the form of correlation coefficients or very
simple regressions that fail to control for a number of factors (such as the size of the dependent
population) which we now know are important. In fact, our data support Cameron in the sense
that there is a cross-sectional association between the two variables, but this relationship does not
hold once proper controls are included in the statistical model (as we shall see). In the case of
Rodrik (1997; 1998), both cross-sectional and pooled time-series evidence is presented, but the
82
 Indeed, trade openness may be more salient for less developed countries because trade
in many of these cases, unlike trade between OECD countries, has led to heavy dependence on a
few primary commodities which are subject to high international price volatility. 
3
 Our thanks to Geoffrey Garrett for generously providing us with the data he used in his
analyses and thereby allowing us to replicate his findings.  Note that Garrett uses levels of
spending on the lefthand side, but this formulation gives an exaggerated estimate for R-squared
since the lagged dependent variable will pick up most of the cross-national variance. Using
changes in spending on the lefthand side avoids this problem while leaving the estimated
coefficients the same. In mathematical terms, we are simply subtracting the lagged dependent
level variable on both sides of the equal sign, which obviously leaves the coefficients for all
variables unchanged. 
analysis includes a large number of less developed, and mostly non-democratic, countries for
which our argument is not necessarily applicable.2
The results that are most relevant for our purposes are presented by Garrett (1998). Not only does
Garrett focus on the same countries that we do, he also includes capital market integration in his
analysis. Furthermore, Garrett’s analysis picks up both cross-national and cross-time variance,
and allows for multiple controls. It is therefore of considerable interest to replicate and further
examine Garrett’s results, as we have done in Table 2. The first two columns of the table
replicates Garrett’s results using change in government transfers and in civilian government
consumption as the dependent variables.3 First note that the results for trade openness are weak
and statistically insignificant. Somewhat surprisingly, Garrett’s own results do not support the
trade openness argument. On the other hand, the coefficient for the interaction between what
Garrett calls left labor power and capital market openness is positive and statistically significant,
supporting Garrett’s thesis that open capital markets leads to higher spending when the political
left is strong and unions are encompassing (left labor power is a composite index of these
variables). 
[Table 2 about here]
9These results, however, turn out to be highly sensitive to the precise specification of the control
variables. One of these controls is GDP growth which Garrett (1998, p.80) explains with
reference to an article by Roubini and Sachs (1989). In that article the authors argue that
governments make spending decisions based on economic forecasts which rely on actual growth
in the recent past. If growth turns out to be unexpectedly high, spending as a proportion of GDP
will be smaller than anticipated, while spending will be higher if GDP growth is unexpectedly
low (Cusack, 1997, 1999). They therefore define an unexpected growth variable which is the
difference between actual growth in a given year and average growth in the previous three years.
This variable is obviously correlated with GDP growth, but it is not identical, and we have
consequently substituted Roubini and Sachs’ variable for Garrett’s simple GDP growth variable
in columns 3 and 4. 
In addition, we made some refinements to the variables intended to remove non-discretionary
components of spending. In the case of transfers the relevant controls are the rate of
unemployment and the size of the old age population. These variables can be improved by taking
account of the fact that the generosity of transfers varies across time and countries. A more
accurate measure for non-discretionary transfers would therefore be to multiply the change in the
size of the dependent population (i.e., the proportion of unemployed and old people) by the
generosity of transfers at any given point in time. In turn, generosity can be measured as the share
of transfers in GDP relative to the share of the dependent population in the total population
(Cusack, 1997, 1999). This composite variable is used in column 3 in place of the unemployment
rate and the old population rate.
In the case of government consumption the number of unemployed and old people is irrelevant
(as Garrett’s results clearly show), but there is a different non-discretionary effect that Garrett
does not take into account. Because costs in public services (especially wage costs) tend to
increase at the same rate as in the rest of the economy, while productivity does not, a constant
level of provision will result in prices on government services rising faster than in the economy
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as a whole. This non-discretionary component of government consumption can be removed by
another measure, called automatic consumption, which is the share of government consumption
in GDP times the relative rate of growth in the price deflator for government services divided by
the rate of growth in the price deflator for the entire GDP (Cusack, 1997). 
From the rise in explained variance, we can see just how important relative price changes are for
government consumption. More importantly, the effects of capital market openness completely
disappear once these refined controls are included. This is the case whether we look at
consumption or transfers. With respect to trade openness, one can see that the parameter on this
variable is insignificant as before, but the sign on the interaction term is now actually in the
wrong direction. In short, there is no suggestion in Garrett’s data of a relationship between
globalization and welfare state spending once we use more refined control variables. The only
result that holds up is that left-labor power has a significant expansionary effect on government
consumption — a finding that is echoed in the more extensive analysis presented below. Of
course, this does not undermine Garrett’s main conclusion that globalization is compatible with a
large welfare state, but it does suggest that we have to seek the explanation for the expansion of
the welfare states in domestic rather than in international conditions.
Deindustrialization and the Labor Market Risk Structure
As do Garrett and Rodrik, we believe that exposure to risk in the labor market is a powerful
determinant of peoples’ preferences for state protection and public risk sharing. Unlike Garrett
and Rodrik, however, we believe that the main sources of risk are to be found in domestic
economic processes. In particular, we argue that the labor market dislocations associated with
major shifts in the occupational structure have been a driving force behind the expansion of the
welfare state since the early 1960s. To get a sense of the numbers, in 1960 about 60 percent of
the labor force in the OECD area was employed in agriculture or industry; 35 years later this
figure was down to about 30 percent. As we document below, this massive sectoral shift is the
outgrowth of deep forces of technological change that have coincided with progressive market
saturation and shifting patterns of demand -- structural-technological conditions that also
11
characterized the industrial revolution. Given what we know from the work of Esping-Andersen
(1985, 1990), Korpi (1978, 1983), Stephens (1979), and others about the relationship between the
rise of industry and the early development of the welfare state, one would expect such a massive
transformation of the occupational structure to be of great importance in the demand for, and
supply of, welfare state programs. 
Changes in the occupational structure are mediated by the transferability of skills and social
benefits. Transferable skills protect against market vagaries by making individuals less dependent
on a single employer, or on employers in a particular branch of the economy. Labor market risks
are therefore generated across the interfaces between economic sectors requiring very different
types of skills. This logic is reinforced when we consider that privately provided social benefits
such as health insurance and pensions also tend to be constrained by the transferability of skills.
The reason is that when skills are firm-specific, employers have an incentive to provide non-
transferable company benefits, both as a tool of control over its workforce, and as an incentive
for their employees to acquire additional firm-specific skills. Correspondingly, if skills are
industry-wide, there is a rationale for employers in that industry to provide benefits that are
transferable across firms, but only within the industry. Although the latter depends on the ability
of employers to collude in the provision of both skills and benefits, the point is that the
transferability of benefits will not exceed the transferability of skills in the absence of state
intervention. 
The approximate correspondence between the scope of employer-sponsored insurance and the
transferability of skills tells us a great deal about the sources of demand for welfare state
expansion. Once a worker is permanently dismissed from a firm or occupation within a sector,
and has to transgress the interfaces defined by skill discontinuities, both skills and benefits will
be forfeited or downgraded. In some cases this means that workers are left outside employment
with no or few means of support; in other cases it means that workers find new jobs at
substantially reduced wages and benefits levels. It is therefore only through the mediation of the
state that workers can protect themselves against the risks of major shifts in the economic and
12
occupational structure. Such protection comes in the form of state-guaranteed health and old age
insurance (which makes it possible to move across sectoral interfaces without losing benefits), as
well as through early retirement and certain forms of disability insurance which facilitate a
relatively painless exit from the labor market (and therefore makes it possible not to have to
move across the skill interfaces). When skills and benefits do not travel well, while large
numbers of people face the risks of having to make such "travels", demand for state-sponsored
compensation and risk-sharing will be high.
Like the distinction between agriculture and industry in the previous century, the distinction
between manufacturing and services represents one of the most important economic interfaces
affecting the transferability of skills. Most skills acquired in either manufacturing or in
agriculture travel poorly to services occupations. Even low-skilled blue-color workers find it hard
to adjust to similarly low-skilled service sector jobs because they lack something that, for lack of
a better word, is called "social skills". Although there are other economic interfaces -- between
manufacturing industries, types of services, etc. – the one between agriculture and
manufacturing, on the one hand, and services is a particularly difficult one to traverse. This is
why the decline of employment in the primary and secondary sectors of the economy is of great
importance for understanding the demand for welfare state spending, whether in the form of
transfers or in the form of jobs in the public sector. 
Considering this obvious link between labor force transformations and welfare state spending, it
is truly remarkable how little attention deindustrialization has been accorded in the study of
welfare state dynamics. Not a single large-N, cross-national study of the welfare state has to our
knowledge focused on deindustrialization as a driving force, or even included it as a control
variable. Perhaps this omission is due to a misconception that deindustrialization is uniform
across countries, and therefore cannot explain cross-national variance in the speed of welfare
state expansion. In fact, however, deindustrialization varies greatly in time and space. For
example, in an early industrializing country like the United States, industrial employment as a
13
4
 In two-party systems the mechanism is vote maximization (Downs 1957; Cox 1990); in
multi-party systems it is office maximization (Laver and Schofield 1991).
percentage of the adult population declined by only 3 percentage points between 1960 and 1995,
whereas for a late industrializer like Sweden, the figure is 13 percent. 
Both the magnitudes of the sectoral shifts in employment, and the cross-national differences, are
magnified by the decline of agriculture. Although we usually associate agricultural decline with
the rise of industry, the two processes started to move in phase in the early- to mid-1960s,
particularly in countries that industrialized late. Agricultural decline is due to the same forces of
structural-technological change -- explored in a subsequent section -- and when we talk about
deindustrialization in the following we have in mind this secular, long-term and structurally-
driven process of labor shedding in both agriculture and industry beginning in the early 1960s. 
While we maintain that deindustrialization is a crucial (and neglected) source of welfare state
expansion, we are not implying that political and institutional factors are unimportant. The
welfare state is a mechanism for redistribution as well as risk-sharing, and we would therefore
expect partisan governments and organized interests to shape social policies in order to benefit
the distributive interests of their own constituencies. As argued by Garrett (1998), where unions
are strong and centrally organized, and where left governments have been dominant, the welfare
state can be expected to assume a more redistributive form. Likewise, redistribution is affected
by the location of the median voter insofar as political parties adopt policies that will appeal to
the median voter.4 The lower the income of the median voter, and the more exposed to risk, the
greater the pressure for redistributive policies (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Since low-income
workers in tenuous labor market positions are less likely to vote than better educated and higher-
income people (Lijphart 1997), an indirect measure of the median voter location is the extent of
participation in national elections. 
The explanatory salience of these variables depends on the extent to which we look at spending
categories that have a redistributive effect. Aggregate levels of transfers are not necessarily
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higher under left than under right governments insofar as such transfers can be used to address
labor market risks without affecting income or status differentials (Esping-Andersen 1990). By
contrast, government service provision is inherently redistributive because it offers people equal
access to services -- such as education, health care and housing -- which are paid for through
taxation. In addition, egalitarianism and public sector expansion are causally related because
earnings compression undermines the growth of low-productivity, price-sensitive, private service
sector jobs and puts pressure on the government to provide jobs in the public sector (Esping-
Andersen 1993, 1994; Iversen and Wren 1998; Glyn 1997). So while deindustrialization
everywhere propels growth of welfare state spending, whether in the form of government
transfers or consumption, we expect the distributive aspects of the rising service economy, and
the private-public sector mix of employment, to vary according to political parameters.
Findings
We use an error correction model of the type introduced in Table 2, with changes in government
transfers and civilian government consumption as the dependent variables. The model has the
following form:
Yt, i =  + 1 . Yi, t-1 +   j . X ji,t-1, +   j. X ji,t, ,
where Y is a spending variable, and X is an independent variable. The subscripts t and i refer to
the particular time period and country, respectively, while the superscript j refers to the particular
independent variable.  is the first difference operator. 
Note that the independent variables have been entered as both lagged levels -- X t-1 -- and as first
differences -- X t. Although not intuitively obvious, it can be shown that the parameter for a
level variable measures the permanent (or long-term) effect of a one-off change in that variable
while the parameter for a change variable measures the transitory (or short-term) effect of a one-
off change in that variable (Beck 1992). If a variable exhibits only transitory effects, unless it
changes continuously, spending will eventually revert back to its original level (assuming that the
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 This does not have to be the case. One of the control variables, unexpected GDP growth,
can in principle rise indefinitely. 
parameter for the lagged dependent level variable, 1, is between 0 and -1). Since all the
theoretical variables are defined as proportions (either of GDP or of the working age population),
they cannot grow (or fall) indefinitely, and will therefore have no long-term effects on spending
unless the parameters for the their lagged levels are significant.5 Hence, the parameters for the
change variables are only relevant for examining the specific time dynamics of an independent
variable, and we have only included first differences for those independent variables that are of
particular theoretical interest. 
We use fairly much the same set of explanatory variables for both transfer spending and civilian
government consumption outlays. The exact variable definitions and data sources are
summarized in Appendix B.  The only difference between the two specifications is the
“autonomous” spending term in each equation. In the equation for transfers, this item is based on
the prevailing level of generosity of the program (at time t-1) times the first difference in the size
of the clientele for such programs. In the equation for government consumption, the autonomous
spending term is a function of the prevailing level of spending (at time t-1) times the rate of
change in the relative prices confronting government. As discussed above, in both instances the
argument is that there are non-discretionary elements to spending which needs to be eliminated in
any well-specified model. 
In addition to the lagged level of the spending component, there are four sets of variables in each
specification.  First, there is a set of variables meant to detect whether international or domestic
economic sources are driving spending. On the international side, we have included measures of
trade openness as well as capital mobility. On the domestic side, we have introduced a measure
for deindustrialization which is defined as 100 minus the sum of manufacturing and agricultural
employment as a percentage of the working age population. The base of 100 is somewhat
arbitrary. For example, one could have used the peak of employment in agriculture and
manufacturing as the base; a number that varies across countries. However, the statistical
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 An F-test indicates that the country dummies belong in the model. 
7
 We wish to thank John Stephens for making this variable available to us. 
analysis is insensitive to the choice of base due to the inclusion of a full set of country dummies.6
If each country has a unique base, it simply alters the nationally specific intercepts, and the
dummies permit these to take on any value.
The analysis also includes a variety of political variables. These are the level of electoral turnout,
the left-right partisan composition of the government, and a measure of the relative strength of
labor within the industrial relations system. In addition, we have included a variable that
measures the decentralization of the political decision-making process in order to capture the
notion that diffusion of power affords minority groups opportunities to block legislation that
would change status quo, and hence spending levels (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993).7 The
remaining control variables have already been introduced in the discussion of Garrett’s results.
The equations have been estimated using a pooled data set with 15 countries and a temporal
domain ranging from 1961 up to and including 1993, a period of 33 years. Tests for
heteroskedasticity in both pooled regressions suggested the need to correct for this problem and
so we employed Beck and Katz´s (1995) method for deriving panel corrected standard errors.
The final results for both pooled analyses are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
The findings for the transfer spending equation are presented in column 1 of the table. Note that
none of the globalization variables registers a statistically significant impact on the spending
variable. By contrast, both the level and change in deindustrialization have coefficients that take
on the expected signs, and are statistically significant at a .01 level or better. In substantive terms,
the impact of a one percent decline in employment in the traditional sectors is to elevate the long
term target equilibrium for social transfer spending by approximately .4 percent. The results thus
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 A typical left government is defined here as one that is one standard deviation to the left
of the mean on the partisan government variable. A typical right government is defined similarly. 
suggests that the forces of change that have propelled the expansion of transfer payments over the
past three decades are to be found in domestic economic processes, not in the global economy.
None of the political terms register any impact. As discussed previously, the level of transfer
payments is not necessarily a contentious partisan issue unlike the distributive composition of
such payments. As Esping-Andersen notes, “there is no reason to expect that expenditure
commitments, as such, should be related to left-party power” (1990, 115). Right as well as left
governments, exposed to the pressures of democratic politics, recognize the need to address the
risks that people encounter in the labor market, and these risks are largely captured by the
deindustrialization variable. Where they obviously differ is in terms of whose interests in the
electorate are accorded more or less attention, and this is a distributive issue to which the
aggregate level of transfers does not speak. 
In this respect the logic of government consumption is very different since public provision of
services directly reduces inequalities in peoples’ access to education, health care, etc., and
because public employment is used by left governments to support egalitarian wage policies
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Iversen and Wren 1998). Unsurprisingly, therefore, all of the political
variables turn out to affect civilian government consumption in the predicted direction. Thus
each percentage increase in the electoral participation rate raises the target level of spending by
about .15 percent. Likewise, a typical left government spends about 2 percent more than a typical
right government if we look at the long run.8 The strength of labor in the industrial relations
system also has an upward effect on spending, as expected, whereas decentralized government
structures, as predicted by Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993), tend to reduce spending. 
In terms of the globalization variables, trade and capital market openness both exhibit small
significant effects on consumption, but for capital mobility the effect is entirely transitory, while
for trade it goes in the opposite direction of that predicted by the openness argument. It is
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conceivable that the negative effect for trade reflects its differential welfare effects. Thus, while
growing exposure to competition from low wage countries raises the risk for those already at
high risk (Wood 1992; Leamer 1984, 1996), trade may well be welfare-improving for all others
(Rodrik 1997, ch. 4). Whatever the explanation, the magnitude of the effect is small. Thus, for
each percentage point that the foreign sector grows, the long-term equilibrium level of civilian
government consumption declines by only .07 percent. 
Compare these results to those for deindustrialization. For each percent decline in employment in
the traditional sectors, the target level of civilian government consumption is raised by nearly .6
percent.  The short-term impact is to elevate the actual spending level by .1 percent for every
percent decrease in employment in the traditional sectors. If we combine these results with the
equally strong results for government transfers, it is clear that the effects of the domestic
economic variables are far and away more important than globalization in shaping government
spending. 
Another feature of the findings deserves emphasis: The effect of de-industrialization persists
over time. Apparently spending gets "locked in" by organizational and institutional factors that
are exogenous to our model. As argued by Pierson (1994, 1996), spending itself creates political
clienteles that will press for further spending and resist attempts at retrenchment. Hence, even
though the process of de-industrialization is the causal agent in the expansion of the welfare
state, the disappearance of this causal agent will not necessarily lead to retrenchment -- "merely"
retard further expansion. However, the character of the political game over welfare policies is
likely to change when compromises involving overall expansion are no longer feasible; a
conjecture that deserves further exploration considering that the process of deindustrialization is
coming to a halt in many countries. 
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The Sources of Deindustrialization
Our results strongly suggest that deindustrialization, not trade or capital market openness, is the
driving force behind the expansion of government spending on both transfers and services.
Nevertheless, it could be objected that deindustrialization may itself be a consequence of trade
and financial openness, or that it is caused by, not causing, government spending. Even though
either one of these possibilities are interesting in their own right, they would obviously radically
alter our understanding of the relationship between deindustrialization and spending. In order to
complete our argument, we therefore have to show that deindustrialization is largely driven by
domestic factors other than spending itself.
Economists are divided on the question whether trade causes employment losses in the
traditional sectors. On one side of the debate, reflecting not only a particular economic theory but
also a generally popular view (the “giant sucking sound”), is the idea that the sources of 
deindustrilization in the West during recent decades lays squarely in the competitive pressures
emanating from Third World producers (see, e.g., Wood, 1994, and Saeger, 1996, 1997). From
this perspective, changes in the North-South trade have been estimated to account on average for
50 percent of the reduction in manufacturing that occurred between 1970 and 1990 (Saeger,
1997, p. 604). In addition, it can be argued that the removal of restrictions on capital makes it
increasingly easier for businesses to relocate production facilities to countries with lower wage
costs, and that this in turn diminishes the demand for labor within the industrial sectors of the
advanced market economies (Streeck 1997).
The alternative school, while not denying that trade has played a role in deindustrialization, sees
the principal causes as residing in domestic sources (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997, 1998;
Krugman, 1996). Among these are changing preference patterns away from manufactured goods
and towards services, high productivity growth in the face of inelastic demand, as will as the
associated changes in investment in new productive capacity (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1998,
p. 19). North-South trade accounts for at most one-sixth of the loss in manufacturing
employment in these studies.
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Furthermore, it may indeed be the case that the welfare state is itself responsible for the decline
in employment in the traditional sectors. As Bacon and Eltis (1976) have argued, both the costs
posed by taxation as well as the generosity of the modern welfare state, including the opportunity
to work for at least equivalent if not higher wages in the public sector, have had a tremendous
negative effect on industrial employment. Of course, this is also a view that is popular with
political parties and governments of a neo-liberal bent. Unlike the trade argument, however, there
is little systematic empirical evidence to support the idea. 
Figure 2 provides some descriptive evidence on the question of whether trade causes
deindustrialization. It plots the loss of employment in the traditional sectors from 1962 through
1991 against the average trade openness for the same period. There is little hint of any
relationship. Indeed the correlation between the two series is about 0.17.  
[Figure 2 about here]
Alternatively, if one were to adopt the hypothesis that deindustrialization has more to do with
internal processes, processes of productivity gain and shifting tastes, then one would expect that
a process of convergence has been underway. Thus, early industrializers which had pretty much
gone through this transformation by the beginning of this period would have suffered the least
loss of employment in the traditional sectors, while late industrializers would have experienced
more rapid decline. As Figure 3 demonstrates, there seems to be a fair amount of support for this
position. The correlation between employment intensity in the traditional sectors in the year 1962
and the loss of employment in these sectors over the three succeeding decades is about .85. Thus,
the United States, which had the smallest traditional sectors (about twenty four percent),
experienced the smallest loss (less than five percent), while Finland, lagging well behind the
United States and having nearly fifty percent of its working age population engaged in the
traditional sectors, experienced the largest loss in the sample of fifteen countries, well over
twenty percent.
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 As in the previous analysis, problems of heteroskedasticity led us to employ Beck and
Katz´s (1995) method for deriving panel corrected standard errors.  
10The countries include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Missing
data problems precluded adding Switzerland.  The time frame is the maximum possible given the
availability of data.
[Figure 3 about here]
But descriptive, and indirect, evidence of this nature can sometimes be misleading. We have
therefore estimated a pooled cross-section time-series model which uses the change in the log of
the number of people employed in manufacturing and agriculture as the dependent variable (see
Table 4).9  This is a standard setup in the existing literature except that we have included
agricultural employment on the right-hand side to make the results speak directly to our
deindustrialization variable. However, the results are very similar if we focus exclusively on
manufacturing employment. The analysis includes 14 OECD countries for which we had
complete data in the period from 1964 through 1990.10 
For presentational ease Table 4 divides the independent variables in a group of domestic
variables, and a group of international, variables. Following the existing economic literature we
include among the domestic-structural variables, (i) a measure of productivity growth, (ii) the log
of income per capita and the square of this variable to capture changing consumption
preferences, (iii) the growth in per capita income as a measure of demand effects, (iv) gross
capital formation as a share of GDP, and (v) the two spending variables. For the exogenous
variables we have included (vi) the balance of trade with OECD, with OPEC and with less
developed countries (LDCs), and (vii) the capital market openness variable used above.
[Table 4 about here]
The productivity measure is meant to capture the tendency for firms to shed workers as
productivity increases. Note that there is some theoretical ambiguity with respect to the impact of
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 Investment is measured as a percentage share of GDP.  It took is taken from the Penn
World Tables, Version 5.6.
this variable. While faster productivity growth makes goods relatively cheaper, and therefore
boosts demand, less labor is required to produce the same amount of output. Research, however,
has shown that the latter effect tends to dominate the former. For the income terms, the
expectation is that the parameter on the first term will be positive while that on the second term
is negative, signifying that as income passes beyond a certain level the relative demand for goods
in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors will begin to decline. The effects of capital
formation and growth in income are expected to be positive since both will boost production and
demand for labor.11  
The results are generally very supportive of our argument. Deindustrialization is almost
exclusively driven by domestic factors other than the welfare state. Technological progress,
demand conditions, and shifting demand patterns are what cause employment in industry and
agriculture to decline. There is no evidence that government spending has “crowded out”
employment in the traditional sectors; every indication is that the causal arrow goes in the
opposite direction. Nor does trade appear to be an important source of deindustrialization. A
negative trade balance with other industrialized countries (and the first difference in that trade
balance) does hurt industrial employment, but the effect is substantively small and cannot have
been a major cause of deindustrialization across the OECD area for the simple reason that intra-
OECD trade is relatively balanced over time. 
The crucial question with respect to trade is whether growing trade with less developed countries
has priced out a substantial number of workers in agriculture and industry in the advanced
countries. We find no evidence to that effect. The coefficients on the lagged levels of the trade
balances with OPEC countries and with Third World countries are both negative and statistically
significant, while both of the coefficients on the first differences in these two variables are
statistically insignificant. Note, that these results, which suggest that positive trade balances with
the OPEC and Third World countries lower employment while negative balances promote
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 The results of alternative specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
employment, are not the consequence of multicollinearity. Nor do their effects change in
substantive terms when we use alternative specifications of the model. We have run a large
number regressions using a variety of combinations of trade balances and import penetration, and
the results are all contrary to the “trade leads to deindustrialization” hypothesis. In fact, the
results in Table 4 are the strongest we have been able to produce in support of the popular
perception.12 The same is the case for the capital market openness variable which consistently
fails to produce effects that are statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Our results essentially replicates those in Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1998), even though our
data and model specification are somewhat different. Deindustrialization is driven by deep
economic processes that are unrelated to either openness or spending. Productivity growth in the
traditional sectors leads to a loss in employment, whereas rising demand through growing
investment or incomes have a positive effect. Consistent with Engel’s law, the results also
indicate that demand for agricultural and manufacturing first rises with income and then falls at
higher levels, thereby eventually diminishing the level of traditional employment. We conclude
form this analysis that the causes of government spending are robust to both the charge that
deindustrialization is a mediating variable, and to the charge that its association with spending is
a result of reversed causality. 
Conclusion
The domestic effects of the international economy has been increasingly emphasized in political-
economic theory as well as popular accounts. While there is no denying that international trade
and financial liberalization have heightened interdependence among states and played an ever
more important role in shaping public policy, the causal primacy of these factors in shaping the
dimensions of the welfare state appears to be greatly exaggerated.
The mirror image of the exaggeration of global factors is the neglect of domestic forces of
change -- forces of change that are driven by technological advance and shifting demand patterns.
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These forces have caused massive shifts in the employment structure, the most notable being the
shift from manufacturing to services. Because people often lack skills that travel well between
these sectors, deindustrialization poses significant risks to those workers who are threatened by
displacement. Given that employer-provided social insurance is limited by firm or by industry,
these risks can only be addressed through government expansion of social security and public
employment.
Why has the role of deindustrialization been ignored in explanations of welfare state expansion?
We suspect that one reason is a misconception that the shift in the employment structures is
relatively uniform across countries, a common mistake in political science (Pontusson 1995). As
we document in the introduction to this paper, there is in fact tremendous variation in the extent
of deindustrialization, and our empirical results demonstrate that this factor can account for very
significant proportion of the variance in welfare state spending. Another reason for the omission
is undoubtedly an outgrowth of the idea, deeply ingrained in most of our theories of comparative
political economy, that the rise of the welfare state is linked to strength of the industrial working
class. What our analysis suggests is that any major transformation in the employment structure,
whether from agriculture to industry or from industry to services,  produces insecurities in the
labor market which propel demands for state intervention. 
Governments of all political stripes have responded to these demands by expanding transfer
payments and social service provision. Nevertheless, partisanship continues to be important in
the redistributive aspects of the welfare state. This shows up clearly in the results for public
consumption, which has expanded much more rapidly in countries where the left is strong. We
would conjecture that the same is true for transfer payments if we look at the composition, rather
than the level, of spending. 
In fact, there are reasons to expect that deindustrialization will be associated with increasingly
distinct partisan effects. First, due to gaps in productivity growth across sectors, egalitarian
policies tend to inhibit the expansion of private service sector employment, which present the
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government with an increasingly clear choice between either excluding more and more people
from the labor market, or employing more of them in public service sector jobs. Second, with the
process of sectoral transformation coming to an end in many countries, the political support for
further welfare state expansion is likely to wane, whereas distributive conflicts over existing
welfare state programs are likely to intensify. We believe that these political aspects of
deindustrialization are promising areas for future research.
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Appendix A: Complete data for changes in employment structure
A
Loss in
Manuf.
& Agric.
B
Gain in Priv.
Services
C
A Not
Absorbed
by B
D
Change in
Gov.t
Civ. Serv.
E
Change in
Military
F
Not
Absorbed
USA 1970 0.28 1.65 -1.37 0.70 -0.44 -1.63
USA 1980 1.92 5.20 -3.28 2.73 -1.17 -4.84
USA 1991 4.50 11.86 -7.37 3.26 -1.56 -9.07
Canada 1970 2.39 0.80 1.49 3.40 -0.43 -1.48
Canada 1980 3.20 5.74 -2.54 5.01 -0.66 -6.89
Canada 1991 6.89 9.39 -2.50 6.87 -0.75 -8.62
UK 1970 3.58 0.58 3.00 2.17 -0.08 0.91
UK 1980 9.08 3.48 5.60 4.36 -0.29 1.53
UK 1991 16.48 9.23 7.24 3.34 -0.42 4.32
Neth. 1970 4.83 3.76 1.08 0.58 -0.40 0.90
Neth. 1980 11.41 5.15 6.26 1.48 -0.76 5.54
Neth. 1991 12.02 15.09 -3.07 1.19 -1.04 -3.22
Belgium 1970 3.30 3.35 -0.05 1.34 -0.31 -1.08
Belgium 1980 9.93 5.01 4.93 4.11 -0.51 1.33
Belgium 1991 14.23 7.07 7.16 4.37 -0.66 3.45
France 1970 5.59 3.85 1.74 0.90 -0.82 1.66
France 1980 11.77 6.65 5.12 2.17 -0.98 3.93
France 1991 19.01 8.74 10.27 3.26 -1.21 8.22
Germany 1970 4.16 1.29 2.85 1.25 0.28 1.32
Germany 1980 11.04 3.41 7.62 3.20 0.24 4.18
Germany 1991 16.21 6.21 9.99 3.22 0.05 6.72
Austria 1970 7.58 1.28 6.30 1.21 0.23 4.86
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Austria 1980 12.00 4.11 7.89 3.78 0.22 3.89
Austria 1991 15.55 4.47 11.08 5.66 0.17 5.25
Italy 1970 2.99 2.55 5.43 1.10 -0.22 4.55
Italy 1980 12.35 4.38 7.97 3.16 -0.41 5.22
Italy 1991 18.30 10.08 8.21 3.92 -0.48 4.77
Finland 1970 9.19 2.07 7.11 2.37 -0.24 4.98
Finland 1980 14.29 5.44 8.85 6.43 -0.32 2.74
Finland 1991 22.78 7.98 14.79 9.67 -0.58 5.70
Sweden 1970 6.09 0.26 5.81 5.51 -0.04 0.34
Sweden 1980 10.10 1.14 8.96 14.91 -0.36 -5.59
Sweden 1991 14.94 5.14 9.80 16.48 -0.50 -6.18
Norway 1970 4.58 0.59 3.99 2.27 -0.24 1.96
Norway 1980 8.37 8.92 -0.54 8.86 -0.01 -9.39
Norway 1991 15.02 10.38 4.63 12.25 -0.26 -7.36
Denmark 1970 0.80 2.46 5.51 4.74 -1.40 2.17
Denmark 1980 16.07 3.37 12.70 13.22 -0.48 -0.04
Denmark 1991 18.82 5.44 13.38 14.92 -0.70 -0.84
Japan 1970 5.57 5.77 -0.20 -0.28 -0.02 0.10
Japan 1980 11.18 9.81 1.37 0.46 -0.07 0.98
Japan 1991 13.08 15.19 -2.11 0.23 -0.10 -2.24
Australia 1970 1.39 6.09 -4.70 0.89 0.34 -5.93
Australia 1980 7.74 6.24 1.49 3.71 0.02 -2.24
Australia 1991 13.00 11.94 1.05 4.42 -0.13 -3.24
Average 1970 4.15 2.42 2.53 1.88 -0.25 0.91
Average 1980 10.03 5.20 4.83 5.17 -0.37 0.02
Average 1991 14.72 9.21 5.50 6.20 -0.54 -0.16
Note: Changes are relative to 1962; shares are given as percent of working age population. 
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Appendix B: Variable definitions and data sources
This appendix provides the exact definitions and data sources for the variables included in the
statistical analyses. 
Government transfers. All government payments to the civilian household sector, including
social security transfers, government grants, public employee pensions, and transfers to non-
profit institutions serving the household sector. Source: Cusack (1991) and OECD,  National
Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (various years).
Government consumption. Total government consumption of goods and services net of military
spending as a percentage of GDP. Sources: Cusack (1991), OECD,  National Accounts, Part II:
Detailed Tables (various years), and The SIPRI Year Book (various years). 
Deindustrialization. 100 minus the sum of manufacturing and agricultural employment as a
percentage of the working age population. Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics (various
years).
Trade openness: Total exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP. Source:
OECD,  National Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (various years).
Capital market openness. The index measures the extent to which capital markets are liberalized,
and is presented in Quinn and Inclan (1997). 
Left government center of gravity. This is an index of the partisan left-right “center of gravity”
developed by Cusack (1997). It is based on (i) Castles and Mair’s (1984) codings of government
parties’ placement on a left-right scale, weighted by (ii) their decimal share of cabinet portfolios.
The index varies from 0 (extreme right) to 4 (extreme left), although most observations are much
closer to the mean. 
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Automatic transfers 
 generosity (t	1) #  unemployed  population>65
population
(t) ,
Electoral participation. Based on voter turnout rates as recorded on an annual basis in Mackie
and Rose, the European Journal of Political Research and in International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: A Global Report
on Political Participation. Stockholm: IDEA Information Services
Unexpected growth. Real GDP per capita growth at time t minus average real per capita growth
in the preceding three years. The variable is defined in accordance with Roubini and Sachs
(1989). Source: OECD,  National Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (various years).
Income. Gross domestic product per capita in 1985 US dollars purchasing power equivalents.
Source: Penn World Tables, Version 5.6.
Productivity growth. Annual rate of change in real value added per worker in industry and
agriculture. Source: OECD, National Accounts CD-Rom (1995).
Trade Balances. Merchandise trade balance expressed as a percent of GDP for three country
groupings (OECD, OPEC, Third Word).  Source: IMF, Directory of Trade Statistics Yearbooks
(various years).
Strength of labor. Measured as the product of union density and centralization. The density data
is from Visser (1989; 1996), while the centralization data is from Iversen (1998).
Decentralization of government structures. A composite index based on five measures of the
constitutional structure of the state. Source: Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993). 
Capital formation: Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP. Source: Penn World Tables,
Version 5.6.
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Automatic consumption 
 gov consumption
GDP
(t	1) #  gov deflator (t)
gov deflator (t	1)
GDP deflator (t)
GDP deflator (t	1) ,
where generosity is the percentage share of transfers in GDP relative to the percentage share of
the dependent population in the total population at time t-1. Source: Labour Force Statistics
(various years), and transfer data
where gov deflator is the price deflator for government services, and GDP deflator is the price
deflator for the whole GDP. 
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Tables
Table 1. Structural Change, Absorptive Capacity, and the Effects of Government on
Employment
A
Loss in Manuf.
& Agric.
B
Gain in Priv.
Services
C
A Not
Absorbed
by B
D
Change in
Gov.t
Civ. Serv.
E
Change in
Military
F
Not Absorbed
USA 1970 0.28 1.65 -1.37 0.70 -0.44 -1.63
USA 1980 1.92 5.20 -3.28 2.73 -1.17 -4.84
USA 1991 4.50 11.86 -7.37 3.26 -1.56 -9.07
Canada 1970 2.39 0.80 1.49 3.40 -0.43 -1.48
Canada 1980 3.20 5.74 -2.54 5.01 -0.66 -6.89
Canada 1991 6.89 9.39 -2.50 6.87 -0.75 -8.62
France 1970 5.59 3.85 1.74 0.90 -0.82 1.66
France 1980 11.77 6.65 5.12 2.17 -0.98 3.93
France 1991 19.01 8.74 10.27 3.26 -1.21 8.22
Germany 1970 4.16 1.29 2.85 1.25 0.28 1.32
Germany 1980 11.04 3.41 7.62 3.20 0.24 4.18
Germany 1991 16.21 6.21 9.99 3.22 0.05 6.72
Sweden 1970 6.09 0.26 5.81 5.51 -0.04 0.34
Sweden 1980 10.10 1.14 8.96 14.91 -0.36 -5.59
Sweden 1991 14.94 5.14 9.80 16.48 -0.50 -6.18
Denmark 1970 0.80 2.46 5.51 4.74 -1.40 2.17
Denmark 1980 16.07 3.37 12.70 13.22 -0.48 -0.04
Denmark 1991 18.82 5.44 13.38 14.92 -0.70 -0.84
Average* 1970 4.15 2.42 2.53 1.88 -0.25 0.91
Average 1980 10.03 5.20 4.83 5.17 -0.37 0.02
Average 1991 14.72 9.21 5.50 6.20 -0.54 -0.16
Notes: Changes are relative to 1962; shares are given as percent of working age population. 
* Average for 15 OECD countries listed in Appendix A.
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Table 2. Replicating Garrett’s Regression Results (t-statistics in parentheses).
Garrett’s results Our results
Transfers Consumption Transfers Consumption
Lagged dependent level
Trade openness
Capital openness
Left labor power (LLP)
LLP*Trade openness
LLP*Capital openness
Growth
Old population
Unemployed
Unexpected growth
Automatic transfers
Automatic consumption
-0.141***
(-4.65)
-0.008
(-0.74)
-0.192
(-1.27)
0.067
(0.76)
0.001
(0.41)
0.066**
(2.38)
-0.168***
(-10.50)
0.135**
(2.43)
0.683***
(3.67)
-
-
-
-0.140***
(-5.49)
-0.016*
(-1.73)
-0.380**
(-2.45)
0.134
(1.38)
0.001
(1.00)
0.075***
(2.68)
-0.137***
(-11.53)
0.006
(0.10)
0.008
(0.42)
-
-
-
-0.094***
(-3.21)
0.005
(0.50)
-0.045
(-0.31)
0.116
(1.36)
-0.001
(-0.87)
0.027
(1.05)
-
-
-
-0.077***
(5.75)
0.558***
(6.93)
-
-0.061***
(-3.55)
0.004
(0.44)
-0.012
(-0.12)
0.196**
(2.04)
-0.001
(-0.86)
0.013
(0.71)
-
-
-
-0.097***
(12.14)
-
0.970***
(14.94)
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations
0.42
350
0.48
350
0.42
350
0.67
350
Significance levels: * < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01
Note: The results for period and country dummies are not shown. 
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Table 3. Regression Results for Government Spending (t-scores in parentheses). 
Transfers Consumption
Globalization variables
Deindustrialization
variables
Political variables
Controls
Lagged dependent level
Trade openness
 Trade openness
Capital openness
 Capital openness
Deindustrialization
 Deindustrialization
Left government CoG
 Left government CoG
Electoral participation
Strength of labor
Decentralization of
government power
Unexpected growth
Automatic transfers
Automatic consumption
-0.070***
(-3.30)
-0.005
(-1.12)
0.018
(2.10)**
0.014
(0.49)
0.017
(0.30)
0.043***
(3.02)
0.142***
(3.69)
-0.071
(-1.41)
0.021
(0.32)
0.659
(-0.86)
-0.001
(-0.06)
-0.218
(-1.23)
-0.076***
(6.38)
0.845***
(9.55)
-0.060***
(-4.23)
-0.004*
(-1.70)
-0.005
(-0.95)
-0.005
(-0.30)
-0.071**
(-2.13)
0.033***
(3.39)
0.093***
(4.19)
0.081***
(2.41)
0.030
(0.74)
0.010**
(2.27)
0.009***
(3.00)
-0.274*
(-1.79)
-0.092***
(14.59)
0.980***
(16.03)
Adjusted R-Squared
Number of observations
0.47
495
0.63
495
Significance levels: * < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01
Note: The results for country dummies are not shown. 
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Table 4. Regression Results for Industrialization (t-scores in parentheses). 
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
[Lagged level]
Productivity growth
Income
Income squared
Growth in income
Capital formation
Government Transfers
Government Consumption
-0.113***
(-5.27)
-0.353***
(9.09)
0.523**
(2.18)
-0.30**
(2.24)
0.585***
(8.50)
0.032***
(5.53)
-0.001
(-0.99)
0.001
(0.30)
Capital openness
 Capital openness
OECD trade balance
 OECD trade balance
OPEC trade balance
 OPEC trade balance
LDC trade balance
 LDC trade balance
0.001
(0.30)
0.001
(0.50)
0.002***
(3.47)
0.004***
(4.43)
-0.004*
(-1.96)
-0.003
(-1.35)
-0.003**
(-2.12)
-0.002
(-1.19)
Increase in explained var.
Adjusted R-Squared
Number of observations
35%
378
5%
0.52
378
Significance levels: * < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01
Notes: The increase in explained variance is the change in R-squared when the set of endogenous
and exogenous variables are added to a model where these variables are excluded. The results for
country dummies are not shown. 
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Figure 1. Trade Dependence and Manufacturing Volatility
Notes: Export dependence is the total value of manufacturing exports divided by
value added; volatility is the standard deviation in the rate of growth in
manufacturing output, employment, and wages in the period 1970-93. Output data
is not available for Austria; only employment data is available for New Zealand. 
 
Sources: OECD, The OECD STAN Database (1994).
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Figure 2. Trade Openness and Losses in Traditional Sectors
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Figure 3. Initial Size and Losses in Traditional Sectors
